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Woods  or  Trees? 
Ideas and Actors in the History of Science 
W5  |HEN  I BEGAN to learn a bit about the history of science a quarter  cen- 
tury ago, I discovered that the field was much agitated  about the differ- 
ence between what were called internal and external approaches. No one de- 
fended the distinction; in fact,  most deplored it-and  have continued to  do 
so-but  it remains  an issue. 
In the past quarter century the problem has been transformed.  Externalists 
were defensive and of lowly status in the early 1960s. Since then an articulate 
minority of sociologists and historians  has constructed more self-conscious and 
in some cases explicitly relativist "externalisms"  that are perceived as impugning 
the privileged status of scientific knowledge, that seem to question the cognitive 
autonomy of science as ultimately  and categorically  insulated  from its context. 
In the past decade, however, the great  majority  of historical  practitioners  have 
come to occupy increasingly  nuanced and eclectic positions. We can all agree. 
The problem  is not context as opposed to cognition, but understanding  the struc- 
ture of their integration.  That integration  nonetheless remains  a continuing  prob- 
lem of interpretation,  if not an accurate  description  of sectarian  identities. 
Yet historical practice still reflects primary-and analytically  dysfunctional- 
loyalties to one camp or another; one scholar's foreground  is another's back- 
ground. My own experience as editor of Isis has emphasized  how few historians 
of science succeed in relating ideas to social and institutional  contexts; many 
are unwilling  to try. Most articles still fall unambiguously  into one or the other 
category. 
What then is the basis for this long-standing  difference in emphasis? To a 
significant  extent it reflects a particular  subdisciplinary  tradition;  historians of 
science are still recruited from diverse backgrounds  and individuals enter the 
field with different agendas, disparate  investments in technical preparation,  and 
contrasting  standards  of achievement. And, as we are well aware, the past gener- 
ation has seen a politically charged and polarizing  debate over the social basis 
and consequences of science and technology, over the putative role of ideas and 
of the experts who articulate  them in a hegemonic  imposition  of social control. It 
is hardly surprising  that these emotional and political differences should have 
spilled over into the relatively quiet confines of academic  history. 
But differences over appropriate  method and subject matter  reflect a far more 
These remarks  were prepared  for presentation  at a conference  marking  the fiftieth  anniversary  of 
Harvard's  Department  of the History  of Science, 20 February  1988.  This revision  has benefited  from 
the comments of Drew Gilpin Faust, John L. Heilbron, Thomas S. Kuhn, Mary Jo Nye,  Steven 
Shapin,  and Jeffrey  L. Sturchio. 
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fundamental  distinction, one that transcends internal differences among those 
men and women who think  of themselves as historians  of science. It is the differ- 
ence between what some anthropologists  call emic and etic. Emic approaches  are 
rooted in the attempt to understand  a culture distant in time or space as it is 
perceived and experienced by its members,  while etic approaches  see as funda- 
mental a higher, realer  reality, an organizing  structure  that transcends  the reality 
perceived and negotiated  by the subjects of one's investigation.  I would suggest 
that a developing structure  of scientific ideas is one form of such transcendent 
framework, a pattern of economic development and class relations in a tradi- 
tional Marxist  formulation  another.  In philosophy,  fundamental  problems  of met- 
aphysics, epistemology, or scientific method constitute another  such framework 
that informs even the work of those scholars who call themselves historians  of 
philosophy. From the perspective of most contemporary  scientists, the historical 
actor's perceptions and social location are not without  interest  but are ultimately 
significant  only insofar as they relate to that actor's place in an evolving pattern 
of cognitive understanding.  It is a quintessentially  etic point of view. Interest in 
the structure  of professional  ambitions,  or a time-bound  context of education  and 
practice, becomes a kind of antiquarianism:  these topics are seen as significant 
not in themselves but for their relationship  to a more fundamental  pattern of 
cognitive development. In this etic perspective, all consciousness is in a measure 
false consciousness, its ultimate meaning to be derived from its relation to a 
larger structure,  whether social or cognitive. Much of the excitement surround- 
ing Thomas S. Kuhn's Structure  of Scientific  Revolutions a quarter  century ago 
grew out of polarized  reactions to its pragmatic-and programmatic-attempt  to 
integrate the emic and etic, the temporal and eternal, to show the relationship 
between the time-blindered  and disciplinary-community-oriented  actor and the 
ideas that retrospectively  legitimated  his or her place in a canon of accomplish- 
ment. We are discussing, in other words, a fundamental  difference  between the 
necessary and the contingent, the product  and the process of its production,  the 
abstracted  and the embedded. 
This is not to argue that internalist  positions are necessarily etic, externalist 
emic. Although  there is, I am convinced, a somewhat  greater  tendency for inter- 
nalist scholarship  to reflect an etic point of view, sociologists and social histo- 
rians often impose their own style of etic analysis as well, focusing, for example, 
on issues such as "professionalization,"  or the evolution of institutional  forms. 
But common sense and the best historical  practice tell us that good historians 
have always sought to employ and integrate  both emic and etic perspectives-to 
see both woods and trees. This means reconstructing  the choices, sharing the 
same assumptions  and organizing  ideas as past actors even if we see those actors 
as at some level unknowing  integers in a larger  calculus. It means using percep- 
tions removed from the historian  by time or cultural  distance as both substantive 
element and analytic tool in construing larger structures often opaque to the 
objects of one's research. Even if a historian  pursues etic ends, they must often 
be attained through  emic means, by reconstructing  the experience of particular 
actors in the past. Inaccurate  perceptions  and incorrect  hypotheses are substan- 
tive  factors,  inasmuch as  they  constitute an  aspect  of  experience, inspire 
thought, and compel social action. 
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as well as social and institutional.  As an intellectual,  a scientific actor's choices, 
even if structured  by institutional  locations, are at some level cognitive. Ideas- 
and very specific ones at that-are  fundamental  to his or her identity  as scientist; 
and part of that identity is the awareness  that intellectual  work will constitute the 
retrospective measure of a life's achievement. Understanding  cognitive options 
from the past scholar's point of view is thus a fundamental  research task. Em- 
beddedness is a necessity-for  the historian  of science as well as for the social 
or political historian. I have already suggested that a central  problem  in the his- 
tory of science was not context as opposed to cognition, but understanding  the 
structure  of their integration.  And at some level that integration  necessarily took 
place in the heads and hearts of individual  actors, men and women as they made 
career choices,  identified with  a  particular discipline or  subdiscipline, ap- 
proached  technical problems, and evaluated  their findings. 
These remarks should be understood as being addressed to the historian's 
humble  job of work, not to the formulation  or solution of problems in episte- 
mology or the philosophy of science.' I am neither naive nor utopian enough to 
think that historians can, in fact, reconstruct an actor's perceived world-or 
even succeed in forgetting  what we know about subsequent  progress in the un- 
derstanding  of natural  phenomena.  Nor am I trying  to argue  for the biography  as 
a privileged type of endeavor in the history of science. What I am trying to 
suggest is something  rather  more mundane  and operational:  by looking systemat- 
ically at the past through  an actor's life course, we necessarily follow a checklist 
of relevant choices as perceived by that actor (or actors). Even if one is inter- 
ested, let us say, in an institution, that institution  must function through  its re- 
wards and expectations as perceived and understood  by those who responded  to 
them.2 Institutions are not reducible to tables of organization  or budget lines; 
they are made real by the perceptions, actions, and commitments  of particular 
men and women who function within them. The same kind of remarks  apply to 
disciplines and subdisciplines  as well-and  in fact to institutions  generally.  If one 
is concerned with the development of particular  ideas and techniques one must 
be equally concerned with those past individuals  who oriented their work and 
ambitions around that set of problems. If one is ultimately committed to the 
discipline of history and values historical  practice, then one must necessarily be 
interested in specific past actors, their perceived choices and constraints  no mat- 
ter what one's particular  focus of research. 
Let me illustrate  the implications  of an actor-oriented  approach  by some ref- 
erence  to  my  own  experience. I  have  been  particularly influenced by  my 
own choice of research options, most importantly  by an investigation of mid- 
nineteenth-century  American agricultural  chemists that I undertook a quarter 
1 In this brief compass I have not addressed  the related  problem  of exposition  and narrative.  I am 
concerned instead with a style of formulating  research  and conducting  an appropriate  research  plan 
-one  consistent with a variety of theoretical  and disciplinary  orientations.  For example, important 
recent  studies  by  Martin Rudwick  (The  Great  Devonian  Controversy,  The Shaping  of  Scientific 
Knowledge  among  Gentlemanly  Specialists  [Chicago/London:  Univ.  Chicago Press,  1985]) and Ste- 
ven  Shapin and Simon Schaffer (Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes,  Boyle,  and the Experimental 
Life [Princeton:  Princeton  Univ. Press, 1985])  might both be said to exemplify actor-oriented  ap- 
proaches. But they are very different  books; the authors' differing  analytical  goals implied very 
different  expository  and narrative  strategies. 
2 I have made some related  suggestions,  in "Science  in American  Society: A Generation  of Histori- 
cal Debate,"  Isis,  1983, 74:356-367. 568  CHARLES  ROSENBERG 
century ago. When I read their letters, diaries, and memoranda,  as well as their 
articles and speeches, it was impossible not to try to reconstruct  their world as 
they themselves faced it and as they tried to steer a successful course among its 
shoals. This handful  of institutional  innovators was influenced  by the scientific 
ideals and specific problem sets of Gottingen and Heidelberg in the 1840s and 
1850s, yet motivated  by a peculiarly  American  and pietistic commitment  to moral 
improvement  and the life of the mind. Their peculiar commitment  was to prove 
an agent of change in the growth of higher  education and our agricultural  econ- 
omy. The connections between the laboratory  and an ultimate  context of appli- 
cation were brought  together and made real by particular  actors fashioning ca- 
reers for themselves-yet  conforming  to disciplinary  patterns established in a 
larger intellectual world. In this sense ideas and disciplines become actors as 
well, acting in and on a particular  social and economic system. These agricultural 
chemists can be seen as a point of insertion for new-and  ultimately  significant 
-roles  and research  agendas  in a culture  generally  inhospitable  to the laboratory 
and the academy. Specific ideas and academic values exist, that is, not in some 
realm of disembodied  cognition but in the minds and emotional  priorities  of par- 
ticular  individuals. 
Some of my more recent work on the medical profession in relation to the 
hospital has underlined  the significance  of similar  relationships. In both cases, 
institutional  forms have developed in a kind of symbiosis with the structuring  and 
informing  role of career-driven  and career-oriented  individuals. In both cases, 
moreover, the context of application  (clinical medicine and agricultural  produc- 
tivity) and the context of knowledge  production  and reproduction  (research  and 
teaching) have generated an intricate and historically determined  relationship, 
one that has had enormous  ultimate  impact  not only in the realm of markets  and 
institutions  but inevitably  in that of "basic science" as well. The hospital  became 
in some ways the product  of particular  intellectual  and institutional  developments 
in medicine-of  the growth of the specialties, of mechanism-oriented  models of 
disease, and of the expanded role of technology generally. The interdependence 
of perceived career options, ideas, and the hospital as social institution  not only 
is an extraordinarily  important  aspect of the history of medicine  but is exemplary 
of a good many other crucial relationships  between modern intellectual  life and 
the society that supports  such activity. From another  point of view, it illustrates 
a patterned integration  of context and cognition in which change turns on the 
parallel  interaction  of individual  and institutional  factors. 
Some critics will contend that such discussion of career patterns and applied 
science evades the issues of innovation and change that remain the intellectual 
and emotional  center of science and of its history. I would respond  that an actor- 
oriented, life-course-structured  point of view is particularly  appropriate  to the 
would-be elucidator of scientific ideas. What can we do, after all, other than 
reconstruct as best we can the intellectual and institutional  options that faced 
particular  individuals  or groups of individuals?  We cannot with confidence ad- 
dress the ultimate questions of idiosyncrasy and discovery: what used to be 
called genius is, I feel, too intangible  to serve as a promising  subject  for historical 
analysis. What the historian must seek to understand  is the way in which an 
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agendas; such analysis is less problematic  than the more speculative attempt to 
comprehend  the personal equation that allowed them to redefine  those options. 
(And even if one is valiant  enough  to probe the essence of an individual's  creativ- 
ity, the reconstruction of a protagonist's institutional  and intellectual environ- 
ment remains a necessary precondition.) An actor-oriented  approach seeks to 
appropriate  the individual  in the service of transcending  the individual  and thus 
the idiosyncratic;  it seeks to use an individual's  experience as a sampling  device 
for gaining  an understanding  of the structural  and normative.3 
But perhaps  this is belaboring  the obvious; to some extent we have become an 
audience of the converted. It is now fashionable  to study subdisciplinary  forma- 
tion, laboratory  life, and scientific practice to bring, for example, the implicitly 
relativistic tools of ethnography  to science, even to the once-sacred bastion of 
knowledge  production  and elaboration.  In general  history as well the past quarter 
century has seen historians  move from public policy and elite experience to the 
behavior and ideas of ordinary  men and women-to  the microcosm of everyday 
life and experience. In this sense one can draw a useful parallel between the 
student of past laboratory  practice or a physicist's graduate  school training,  on 
the one hand, and, on the other, the social historian  of the household or the labor 
historian  seeking to reconstruct  the negotiated  world of the shop floor. 
Yet a kind of dialectic is already manifesting  itself. We are already beset by 
calls for a return to the traditional  "big questions" of social change and state 
policy-even  moral  judgment-that have so long concerned  and motivated  histo- 
rians. Historians of science too must respond to this need to move from the 
particular  to the general, from the individual  actor to broader  patterns  of intellec- 
tual and institutional  development. The relationship  between the particular  and 
general, between meaning and structure, has always been a key to historical 
understanding;  it is a tension that constitutes  both a fundamental  aspect of reality 
and an elusive challenge  to social science method. 
The woods and trees metaphor  is particularly  apt in this connection. The con- 
temporary  ecologist's conception of a particular  woods assumes and necessitates 
an understanding  of the trees-their  species, their climatic and nutritional  needs; 
woods and trees are in this sense indistinguishable  in some sense as interactive 
system and as a linked research  agenda.4  We too must disentangle  and specify in 
our particular  sphere the relationships  between the actor's perceptions  and striv- 
ings, his or her institutional  climate, the soil that nurtures-or fails to nurture- 
particular  career and cognitive options. And we must also move this style of 
analysis into society from the laboratory  and library,  to evaluate the dissemina- 
tion and ultimate  impact of the products  of cognition. We cannot understand  the 
modern  world without an understanding  of those necessary connections between 
the individual and his or her discipline, between the discipline and the social 
3 This is not to denigrate  biography  as genre or prescribe  a particular  style of biography.  I would 
argue, however, that unless the would-be  biographer  tries to reconstruct  a protagonist's  social world 
in emic terms-to  write a life in a very particular  time-he  or she will hardly  succeed in explaining 
that subject's actions or evaluating  the motives that impelled  them. 
4 Cf. Charles  E. Rosenberg,  "Towards  an Ecology of Knowledge,"  in The Organization  of Knowl- 
edge in Modern  America, 1860-1920, ed. Alexandra  Oleson and John Voss (Baltimore:  Johns Hop- 
kins Univ. Press, 1979),  pp. 440-455. 570  CHARLES  ROSENBERG 
sources of its support, between ideas and their real impacts in a real world. It is 
these interactions at least that originally attracted me to the field and which 
remain  in enticing measure unexplored. 
Sometimes one wonders  whether  the history of science is a coherent  discipline 
or just a collection of scholars aggregated  by the accidents of history and the 
accretion of a common historiography.  And in some sense we are indeed a di- 
verse lot, a kind of mosaic, each component tile discrete and isolated. But at 
the same time we are bound together by certain thematic unities, like any well- 
composed mosaic, and one of those integrating  unities is precisely the structured 
tension between the external and internal. It  is  not a problem that can be 
"solved" but a condition of our collective identity. 
Charles Rosenberg 
September  1988 
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